I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search and matching frictions in order to determine the optimal public sector wage policy. Public sector wages are crucial to achieve efficient allocation of jobs. High wages induce too many unemployed to queue for public sector jobs, in turn raising unemployment. The optimal wage depends on the frictions in the two sectors. Following technology shocks, public sector wages should be procyclical, and deviations from the optimal policy significantly increase the volatility of unemployment.
Introduction
Most papers on the macroeconomics of fiscal policy consider government consumption as goods bought from the private sector.
1 However, the main component of government consumption is compensation to employees. In the United States, the public sector wage bill represents around 60 percent of government consumption expenditures. Government employment is not just an important aspect of fiscal policy, but also a sizable element of the labour market. In the United States, around 16 percent of all employees work in the public sector. Given the proportion of this type of expenditure, it seems plausible that fiscal policy is at least partly transmitted through the labour market.
Employment and wage levels in the public sector are relevant, not just because of their weight in the economy or the government's budget but also because they play an important role in the business cycle. Since 2004, the Internet search engine Google has released a weekly index of keyword searches. Figure 1 shows the growth rate of keyword searches for the terms 'Jobs' and 'Government jobs' within the United States, relative to the previous year. From August 2008, as the recession worsened, the number of searches for jobs increased dramatically, but it is clear that from February 2009, people increasingly specified government jobs. Repeating the exercise for the United Kingdom reveals a similar picture. Indeed, this change in the search patterns during the recession gained such proportions that it was noticed by the press. The following quote is particularly insightful regarding its causes:
Wall Street may be losing its luster for new U.S. college graduates who are increasingly looking to the government for jobs that enrich their social conscience, if not their wallet. In the boom years, New York's financial center lured many of the brightest young stars with the promise of high salaries and bonuses. However, the financial crisis has tainted the image of big banks, and with fewer financial jobs available, Uncle Sam may be reaping the benefit. (Reuters, 11 th of June
2009)
This quote hints that during the recession, more people searched for public sector jobs for two reasons. First, as wages in the private sector fell, more people turned to the public sector, where wages are insulated from market forces. Second, fewer jobs were available 1 At least this is the approach taken by most articles that study the aggregate effects of government spending. For instance, Barro (1990) studies the effects of productive and unproductive spending in an endogenous growth model. Baxter and King (1993) examine their effects in a Neo-Classical setting, Linnemann and Schabert (2003) extends this model to the New Keynesian model and Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) introduces rule of thumb agents. All of these papers consider government spending as goods bought from the private sector. in the private sector while the government continued to hire. Indeed, in the United States, government employment has increased during 9 out of the last 11 recessions. These two facts suggest that both government employment and wages are important elements in explaining the business cycle fluctuations of unemployment.
This study aims to provide a comprehensive yet simple framework to study optimal public sector employment and wage policy both in the steady state and over the business cycle. I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search and matching frictions along the lines of Pissarides (2000) , with both public and private sectors. The key mechanism builds upon the observation that the unemployed direct their search to one sector or the other, depending on the probabilities of finding a job, the wages and the separation rates. Because the unemployed have a choice of where to search, public sector wages have a crucial role in achieving optimality. First, I solve the social planner's problem to find the constrained efficient allocation. I then solve the decentralized equilibrium and determine the public sector wage consistent with the optimal steady-state allocation. If the government sets a higher wage, for example, due to strong public sector unions, it induces too many unemployed to queue for public sector jobs and raises private sector wages, thus reducing private sector job creation and increasing unemployment. Conversely, if the government sets a lower wage, due to budgetary constraints, for example, few unemployed want a public sector job and the government faces recruitment problems. The optimal wage premium primarily depends on the difference in the labour market friction parameters between the two sectors. For instance, a lower separation rate in the public sector induces many unemployed to concentrate their search on this sector; thus, the government should offer lower wages to offset this. For the chosen calibration, the optimal wage is 2.5 percent lower than in the private sector.
I also examine the properties of the model when subject to technology shocks. Optimal government policy consists of counter-cyclical vacancy posting and procyclical wages. If public sector wages are acyclical, recessions make them more attractive relative to wages in the private sector, inducing more unemployed to queue for public sector jobs. This further dampens job creation in the private sector and amplifies the business cycle. Deviations from the optimal policy can entail significant welfare losses. If, for instance, public sector wages do not respond to the cycle, unemployment volatility doubles. While the result that public sector wages should be procyclical is very robust, the result of counter-cyclical vacancy posting is not; it depends on both preferences and the type of shock driving the business cycle.
This paper adds to the literature examining the transmission mechanisms of public sector employment with search and matching frictions.
2 According to Holmlund and Linden (1993) , an increase in public employment has a direct negative effect in unemployment but crowds out private employment due to an increase in wages. Hörner, Ngai, and Olivetti (2007) study the effect of turbulence on unemployment when wages in the public sector are insulated. They conclude that an increase in turbulence induces the more risk-averse unemployed to search for jobs in public companies, resulting in higher aggregate unemployment than if the companies were managed privately. This paper is more related to Quadrini and Trigari (2007) . However, despite having similar models, I analyse optimal government wage and vacancy policies both in the steady state and over the business cycle, rather than just looking at the effects of exogenous business cycle rules on volatility. By focussing on optimal policy, I find that some of their results are not general. While they find that the public sector's presence increases unemployment's volatility, I show that this volatility crucially depends on what business cycle policy the government follows. If the government follows the optimal business cycle policy, then the public sector's presence reduces unemployment volatility. Furthermore, while in their setting to stabilize total employment, the government's best policy is to have procyclical public sector employment, the optimal policy is actually counter-cyclical.
A few other recent papers use alternative search approaches to study the effect of public sector employment on private sector wage distribution. Burdett (2012) includes a public sector in a Burdett and Mortensen (1998) framework where firms post wages. Bradley, Postel-Vinay, and Turon (2013) further introduce on-the-job search and transitions between the two sectors. Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2013) consider heterogeneous human capital and match specific productivity in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model. While these papers assume that unemployed randomly search for jobs across sectors, I assume that the unemployed can direct their search towards the private or the public sector. Microeconometric studies provide evidence that individuals deliberately choose the private or public sector based on the expected wage differential. Nevertheless, I also show that the main qualitative results on optimal wages hold if job searches are random. Directed searches just amplify the costs of not following the optimal policy through the endogenous reaction of the unemployed.
Model

General setting
The model is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with public and private sectors. The only rigidities present are due to search and matching frictions. Public sector variables are denoted by the superscript g, while private sector variables are denoted by p. Time is denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, ...
The labour force consists of many individuals j ∈ [0, 1]. A subset of the labour force is unemployed (u t ), while the remainder work in either the public (l g t ) or the private (l p t ) sector.
Total employment is denoted by l t . The presence of search and matching frictions in the labour market prevents some unemployed from finding jobs. The evolution of employment in both sectors depends on the number of new matches m
Workers
The value of each member to the household depends on their current state. The value of being employed in sector i is given by:
where
is the stochastic discount factor. The value of being employed in a specific sector depends on the current wage, as well as the continuation value of the job, which depends on the separation probability. Under the assumption of directed search, unemployed are searching for a job in either the private or the public sector, with value functions given by:
Beside the marginal utility from unemployment, the value of being unemployed and searching in a particular sector depends on the probability of finding a job and the value of working in that sector. Optimality implies that movements between the two segments guarantee no additional gain for searching in one sector vis-à-vis the other:
This equality determines the share of unemployed searching in each sector. We can re-write this as
which implicitly defines s t . An increase in the value of employment in the public sector, driven by either wage increases or a separation rate decrease, raises s t until no extra gain exists for searching in that sector. Under the directed search assumption, wages in the public sector play a key role in determining s t . If unemployed randomly search between sectors, public sector wages would still have an effect through the value of unemployment, but it would be weaker.
Private sector firms
The representative firm hires labour to produce private consumption goods. The production function is linear for labour, but part of the resources produced have to be used to pay for
At time t, the level of employment is predetermined with the firm only able to control the number of vacancies it posts. The value of opening a vacancy is given by
where J t is the value of a job for the firm, given by
Free entry guarantees that the value of posting a vacancy is zero (V t = 0); therefore, we can combine the two equations into
].
The condition states that the expected cost of hiring a worker must equal its expected return. The benefit of hiring an extra worker is the discounted value of the expected difference between the worker's marginal productivity and his or her wage, plus the continuation value, knowing that with a probability λ p the match is destroyed.
Finally, I consider private sector wages as the outcome of Nash bargaining between workers and firms. The sharing rule is given by
where b is the workers' bargaining power.
Government
The government produces its goods using a linear technology on labour. This type of good is different from private consumption goods: it is non-rival and supplied to the representative family for free. As in the private sector, the costs of posting vacancies are deducted from production.
The government collects lump sum taxes to finance its wage bill:
The numeraire of this economy is the private consumption good. As a public good is not sold, it has no actual price. However, there is an implicit relative price given by the marginal rate of substitution. The formulation of the production function (16) implies that the cost of recruiting is given in units of the public good. Alternatively, if the cost was included in the budget constraint, it would be expressed in units of private consumption.
The government sets a policy for the sequence of vacancies and wages {v
Wages are set one period in advance, at the time it posts the vacancies. As s t is determined on the basis of expected future wages in the two sectors, the current public sector wage does not affect any decision variable. I will compare the optimal policy, which arises from the social planner's problem, with policies that are exogenously constrained, for instance, due to strong public sector unions or budgetary constraints.
Decentralised equilibrium
Definition 1 A decentralised equilibrium is a sequence of prices {r t , w 
Social planner's solution
Many decentralised equilibria are possible depending on the government's wage and vacancy policies. In my evaluation, I use the constrained efficient solution as a benchmark. The social planner's problem is to maximize consumers' lifetime utility (4) subject to the labour market and technology constraints (1-3, 11 and 16). The first-order conditions are given by
Constrained efficient allocation consists of a triplet of sequences {v
. Conditions (18) and (19) describe optimal private and public sector vacancies. On the left hand side, we have the expected cost of hiring an extra worker. The right hand side gives us the marginal social benefit of hiring this additional worker. It consists of the worker's expected marginal productivity minus the utility cost of working, weighted by the matching elasticity with respect to vacancies, plus continuation value. This last element enters with a negative sign, reflecting that hiring an additional worker makes it harder for both sectors to recruit a worker in the future.
The optimal split of the unemployed between sectors, pinned down in (20), depends on the following factors: i) the marginal utility of consumption of both goods, ii) the number of vacancies and their costs and iii) the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment in both sectors.
In order to implement the first-best allocation, the government can directly set the optimal path of vacancies as well as an appropriate path for public sector wages in order to induce the optimal proportion of unemployed searching for public sector jobs. But what about private sector vacancies?
Proposition 1 In the steady state, if the government sets the optimal level of public sector vacancies and sets wages such that the optimal share of unemployed is searching for public sector jobs, then if workers' bargaining power equals the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment in the private sector (b = η p ), the level of vacancies in the private sector is optimal.
The proof can be seen in the companion appendix. In a one-sector model, a firm's vacancy posting behaviour entails both a positive and a negative externality: it increases the probability of an unemployed finding a job but reduces other firms' probability of filling a vacancy. The decentralised equilibrium is efficient if the share of the match's surplus that goes to the firm (1 − b) equals the importance of the vacancies in the matching process
what is usually called the Hosios condition. When we include the public sector, externalities arising from directed search join those of public sector vacancies. If more unemployed search in the public sector, the probability of filling a vacancy is higher in the public sector but lower in private sector firms. This proposition states that, in the steady state, if the government is able to internalise the externalities inv g andw g , then private sector vacancies will also be efficient, provided that the Hosios condition is satisfied. If it is not, then the government would need another instrument, such as a vacancy subsidy or tax, to align private vacancies with the first best.
3 2.8 Characterization of optimal policy in the steady state
The main question of interest is how to set optimal public sector wages. Under some restrictions, we can derive an expression for optimal public sector wages in the steady state. Assume that unemployed does not bring any utility to the household: ν u (u t ) = 0 and that the costs of posting vacancies are proportional to productivity ς i =ς iāi . 4 The upper bar denotes the variables in the steady state. If we combine optimality conditions, we can derive an expression characterizing the optimal tightness in each sector,θ i ≡v
The equation shows that optimal tightness is independent of both technology and preferences, depending only on the friction parameters of the corresponding sector. Combining this expression with the competitive equilibrium equation (10) that pins down the split of searching across sectors, we can show that
This equation provides a simple rule for setting optimal public sector wages. They should be indexed to private sector wages, but adjusted by a factor that reflects friction parameters differences: η i ,ς i , λ i and µ i . For symmetrical frictions, wages should be the same in each sector. As in a frictionless labour market, the optimal wage ratio is independent of preferences or the sectors' relative productivity (Finn, 1998) . Differences in preferences or productivity should not be reflected in the relative wages, but via the relative total number of employees. Because a sector's productivity is embodied in the job rather than the worker, any change is reflected by the social planner in terms of quantities (i.e. the amount of public sector goods produced) rather than prices (i.e. the wages received by workers). This becomes clear if we solve for the optimal share of unemployed searching in the public sector:
The optimal search number depends both on both productivity and preferences. If we assume log preferences u(c t , g t ) = log c t + ζ log g t , we can further simplify tō
With symmetric labour market frictions, the optimal number of unemployed searching in the public sector depends only on preferences for the actual size of the public sectors = ζ 1+ζ and the relative size of the public sector isl
Without these assumptions, no closed-form solution exists for the wage ratio; therefore, we have to solve the model numerically. The equations (22) and (23) show how important calibration of the two sectors' friction parameters is for predicting the optimal wage ratio. In order to ensure an accurate prediction, I explore information from several sources. 
Calibration
To solve the model, I assume a CES utility function in logs, which allows us to address the different elasticities of substitution between the two consumption goods. The utility of unemployment is linear.
The model is calibrated to match the US economy at a monthly frequency. I do not assume in my calibration that the government is following optimal wage policy. Instead, I calibrate the public sector wage premium that is consistent with microeconometric estimations. These estimates have proven quite sensitive to a worker's education level and gender or the subsector of government. The survey by Gregory and Borland (1999) places the premium between 0 and 10 percent. I set it close to the lower boundary, at 2 percent (π ≡w
The first graph in Figure 2 shows government employment in the United States since 1947. Under the baseline calibration, steady-state vacancies in the public sector are such that employment therein corresponds to the sample's average of 16 percent of total employment (l g = 0.15).
The second graph shows the monthly separation rate for both sectors, taken from the Job Opening and Labour Turnover Survey (JOLTS). The separation rate in the private sector is almost three times higher than in the government: 4.0 against 1.4 percent. The last graph plots the new hires of each sector as a share on total unemployed, which serves as a proxy for the job-finding rate. The probability of finding a job in the government sector is only 3.6 percent compared to 50.6 percent in the private sector.
For an approximation of the matching elasticity with respect to vacancies, I regress the log of the job-finding rate (the ratio between hires in that sector and unemployment) on the log of tightness (the ratio between job openings in that sector and unemployment) for each sector. The estimated coefficients are 0.62 for the private sector and 0.76 for the public sector, which suggest that vacancies are more important determinants of matches in the public sector. These numbers might be biased because we are omitting unemployed that are effectively searching in each sector. If we include a measure of relative search from Google trends as a proxy, the estimated elasticities change to 0.67 and 0.87 respectively. These numbers are similar if we estimate the matching function with the log of new matches as a function of log vacancies and log unemployment, imposing constant returns to scale. I 
set public sector matching elasticity with respect to unemployment, η g at 0.15 and η p at 0.4, slightly higher than the estimated value but in line with estimates from the literature (Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) ). Elasticity with respect to vacancies of 0.85 in the public sector is less extreme than in Quadrini and Trigari (2007) . They use the minimum of vacancies and unemployment as a matching function, which implies a matching elasticity of 1.
A recent paper by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2013) provides some insights into the duration of vacancies by sector. They use JOLTS data to study the behaviour of vacancies and hiring. After adjusting the data, they estimate that government vacancy remains open for 30 days while a private sector vacancy remains unfilled for only 20 days. I calibrate the matching efficiency µ i to reproduce these numbers (q p = 1 andq g = 1.5).
Although I could not find data on public sector recruitment costs in the United States, the United Kingdom has a unique source. Every year, the Chartered Institute of Personal Development performs a recruitment practice survey covering approximately 800 organizations from the following sectors: manufacturing and production, private sector services, public sector services and voluntary, community and not-for-profit sector (CIPD (2009)). The costs of recruiting a worker, which encompass advertising and agency costs, are approximately £4000 for the median firm, corresponding to approximately 8 weeks of the median income in the United Kingdom. On an average, these costs are 40 percent lower in the public sector. I consider that these values indicate that cost per hire is lower in the public sector. I consider the cost of posting a vacancy ς i to be 1.5 in the private sector and 0.8 in the public sector. Given that a vacancy's duration is longer in the public sector, these values imply that the public sector's average cost of recruiting expressed in the same units is 20 percent lower than in the private sector. Under this calibration, recruitment costs total 3.7 percent of total labour costs, close to the value found in Russo, Hassink, and Gorter (2005) . These numbers also imply that public vacancies are only 10 percent of private sector vacancies, which is close to 9 percent found in JOLTS.
The empirical evidence relative to the substitution elasticity between private and government consumption is not conclusive. Evans and Karras (1998) find that private consumption is complementary to military expenditure and a substitute for non-military expenditure. Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) disaggregate expenditure into 'public goods' (defence, public order and justice) and 'merit goods' (health, education and other services). They find that 'public goods' are substitutes and 'merit goods' are complements to private consumption. In the baseline case, I consider an elasticity of substitution of 1 (γ = 0.0), but also discuss the cases where goods are substitutes (γ = 0.5) and complements (γ = −0.5). The parameter ζ, which reflects the preference for government services, is chosen such that the optimal level of public sector employment is 0.15.
For the model to satisfy the Hosios condition in the private sector, the worker's share in the Nash bargaining is set at 0.4. The value of leisure in the utility function is calibrated such that the steady-state unemployment rate is 0.06, implying an outside option equivalent to 50 percent of the average wage. Technology in both sectors is normalised to 1 and the discount factor is set at 0.9955, which implies an annual interest rate of 5 percent. Table 1 summarises the baseline calibration and the implied steady-state values for the key variables.
Optimal public sector wage in steady state
As already shown, the optimal wage ratio primarily depends on the difference between friction parameters in the public and private sectors and only equals one if the sectors are symmetric. Under the baseline calibration, the optimal public sector wage is 2.5 percent lower than in the private sector. Figure 3 shows how this optimal wage varies with the public sector's parameters.
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When the cost of posting vacancies is lower or when matching depends more on vacancies (lower η g ), it is more efficient for the matching to be driven by vacancies rather than by the unemployed. In order to induce fewer unemployed to search in the public sector, the government should pay less to its workers. When the separation rate decreases or matching becomes more efficient, more unemployed turn to the public sector at a time when it would be optimal to have less. As the private incentive is not efficient, the government should offer lower wages to correct this. Quantitatively, the difference between matching elasticities explains one third of the optimal public sector wage gap, while differences in separation rates and vacancy-posting costs account for one sixth each.
The optimal wage ratio positively depends on the disutility of working (χ) and negatively on the productivity of the public sector, but it does not depend on the coefficients of the utility function, namely γ and ζ. Higher χ raises the value of employment in the private sector relative to that in the public sector because people are more likely to have another spell of unemployment if they are employed in the private sector. As this induces more unemployed to search in the private sector, the government needs to offer higher wages to offset this preference.
In the numerical simulations, the cost of posting vacancies is not proportional to productivity. In such a scenario, lower productivity in the public sector indicates that the relative cost of posting vacancies is higher because the marginal utility of public sector goods increases and hiring costs are internal. Although the social planner wants to produce fewer public sector goods, it prefers new matches be driven by the unemployment side to save vacancy posting costs, a decision which requires higher public sector wages.
The parameters of the utility function mainly affect the optimal amount of public sector goods produced, but numerically the parameters do not change the optimal wage ratio. This result occurs because the optimal tightness in the two sectors stays the same, and the different values of working in each sector as well as the value of being unemployed all remain unchanged. As in the frictionless world, preferences determine the relative employment level but not the wage ratio.
To investigate the consequences of paying more to public sector employees, I compare the unemployment rate when the public sector wage is optimal (a gap of 2.5 percent) with the baseline case (a premium of 2 percent). The unemployment rate, which was calibrated to 6 percent in the baseline steady state, falls to 5 percent when the government sets the optimal wage. This happens because many unemployed that were queuing for public sector jobs now find it more attractive to search in the private sector (s changes from 21 to 3 percent), boosting job creation. Interestingly, private sector wages do not go up in line with public sector wages. On one hand, the public sector wages increase an unemployed's outside options if they search in the public sector, exerting an upward pressure on the wage bargaining. On the other hand, such public sector wage increases also entail a negative wealth effect in the real business cycle sense. By increasing unemployment and crowding out private employment permanently, they reduce the total amount of private goods produced in the economy, raising their marginal utility. Higher marginal utility of consumption reduces the value of being unemployed and makes people willing to work at lower wages. The second effect seems to dominate. Welfare costs in the baseline scenario are equivalent to a permanent private consumption reduction of 0.6 percent. All in all, public sector wages are an important determinant of equilibrium unemployment. Figure 4 shows the impulse responses, starting from the efficient steady state, when the government follows the optimal rule. I contrast the optimal policy with the following simple rules for vacancies and wages:
log(w
Existing evidence by Lane (2003) and Lamo, Pérez, and Schuknecht (2008) suggest that public sector wages are less procyclical than private sector wages, particularly in the United States.
8 For simplicity, I consider two cases where public sector wages are acyclical (ψ w = 0).
In the first case, public sector vacancies proportionally decline to increases in private sector vacancies (ψ v = −1). In the second, they are acyclical (ψ v = 0).
After the negative productivity shock, private sector firms post fewer vacancies, resulting in reduced probability of finding a job in this sector; therefore, the unemployed increasingly search for public sector jobs. The unemployment rate increases at most by 0.06 percentage points. As pointed out by Shimer (2005) , under a standard calibration, search and matching models cannot generate sufficient fluctuations in unemployment in response to technology shocks.
Optimal government policy will have procyclical wages and counter-cyclical vacancies. The sector reallocation argument advocates hiring more people in recessions. If the private sector has lower productivity, the economy will be better served by the public sector absorbing part of the unused labour force. This result is fragile in two dimensions. First, it depends on preferences. Figure 5 shows the optimal business cycle policy for three cases: if the goods are substitutes (γ = 0.5), complements (γ = −0.5) and the baseline case with an elasticity of substitution of 1 (γ = 0.0). The result is overturned if the goods are strong complements. In this case, during a recession, as the marginal utility of the government services falls with consumption of private goods, the government should also reduce the number of people it employs. The result of counter-cyclical vacancies also breaks down following an economy-wide technological shock or discount factor shocks. As they affect both sectors symmetrically, the argument for sector reallocation no longer holds.
9
On the other hand, public sector wages should follow declines in private sector wages. In recessions, if the government keeps its wages constant, it becomes more attractive relative 
Government spending
Months % Note: Solid line (optimal policy); dash line (counter-cyclical vacancies and acyclical wages) and dotted line (acyclical vacancies and wages). The response of the variables is shown in percentage of their steady-state value, except for unemployment rate and the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs, which is expressed in percentage point difference from the steady state.
to the private sector, thus increasing the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs. This in turn reduces the probability that a vacancy in the private sector will be filled, which further dampens job creation and amplifies the business cycle. We can see that under the two exogenous rules, unemployment shows a much stronger response. The share of unemployed searching of public sector jobs increases by 1.6 percentage points, much higher than under the optimal policy (0.02 percentage points). This result is remarkably robust to alternative preference specifications or business cycle driving forces. This robustness reflects the fact that the optimal wage gap mainly depends on the friction parameters, which do not fluctuate over the business cycle. As a consequence, the two wages should have a very close 
comovement.
10 Table 2 compares the standard deviation of key variables in the alternative policies, as well as when no public sector exists (ζ = 0). If government follows the optimal policy, the presence of public sector employment stabilises unemployment. However, if public sector wages are acyclical, unemployment volatility increases twofold.
In their paper, Quadrini and Trigari (2007) have two conclusions contrary to mine. First, they argue that the presence of the public sector increases unemployment volatility. I show that this result is not general and that the presence of public sector employment affects unemployment volatility in a manner crucially dependant on the government's business cycle policy. Second, they argue that procyclical public sector employment is the best policy to stabilize total employment, but this is not the optimal policy. In their model, the government does not choose wages optimally, in either the steady state or along the business cycle. Procyclical employment can be optimal if public sector wages are not. But if they are, public sector vacancies and employment should be counter-cyclical.
The last column presents the welfare cost of business cycles in the different scenarios.
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When the public sector is absent, fluctuations have a very small welfare cost -approximately 0.028 percent of steady-state consumption. This is a well known result. When the government is present and behaves optimally, the fluctuations have lower welfare costs, but under the two rules, the cost can be up to four times higher. Welfare costs are higher when the goods are complements, as a negative technology shock has further negative effects on the marginal utility of the public good. Optimal business cycle policy requires the policy to remain optimal in the steady state. Outside the efficient steady state, characterizing the optimal business cycle policy is difficult, but we can analyse the volatility of key variables depending on business cycle policy. The last panel of Table 2 shows the case for the baseline steady state. In the two scenarios with acyclical public sector wages, unemployment volatility is three times higher than when the public sector wages respond one-to-one to the private sector.
In a final robustness exercise, I investigate if these conclusions change in the presence of rigid private sector wages. I considered two alternative methods of modelling: one following Hall (2005) and the second following Blanchard and Galí (2010) . In both cases, rigidities are introduced by assuming an ad-hoc expression for wages. Full details and results are shown in the companion appendix. Compared to the flexible wage benchmark, unemployment rate volatility increases three times in the case of Hall (2005) specification and 15 times in the case of Blanchard and Galí (2010) . In both cases, we observe reduced unemployment volatility when government follows a procyclical wage policy, but by less than the benchmark case. The standard deviation of unemployment rate decreases by only 10 percent. Rigid wages reduce the cost of not following a procyclical public wage policy. Although wage rigidity has been proposed in the literature as one solution to the Shimer Puzzle, its relevance is still under discussion. For the main mechanism of the model, only the wages of new-hires are relevant in the decisions. As been argued by Pissarides (2009) , microeconometric evidence suggests that wages in new matches are more procyclical and volatile than average wages.
6 Directed versus random search
Evidence for Directed search
The theoretical model presented in this paper has two important policy prescriptions. First, government wages in the steady state should not be too high relative to the private sector. Otherwise they generate higher equilibrium unemployment. Second, government wages should track private sector wages over the business cycle or unemployment volatility will be higher due to fluctuations in the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs. An important part of the mechanism depends on the assumption of directed search.
According to micro evidence, this assumption is very realistic. As mentioned previously, public sector wage premium substantially varies within groups. As reported in Gregory and Borland (1999) , the premium is much higher for females, veterans and minorities, and is higher for federal government employees compared to state or local government employees. Differences also exist across education levels. Katz and Krueger (1991) find that in the previous two decades, more educated individuals tend to be paid less in the public sector, while individuals with less education tend to receive a higher premium. If people can direct their search, these differences should have repercussions. Gregory and Borland (1999) report a number of studies that found the existence of queues for federal public jobs. For example, Venti (1985) finds that for each federal government job opening, 2.8 men and 6.1 times as many women want the job. Katz and Krueger (1991) find that blue collar workers are willing to queue to obtain public sector jobs, whereas the public sector has difficulty in recruiting and retaining highly skilled workers. Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) also finds evidence in the United Kingdom of low-employability individuals queuing for public sector jobs, as they stand to gain larger potential premia from working there.
Most studies that estimate the public sector wage premium use switching regression models, which posit that the unemployed can self-select to work in the sectors offering more advantages. Blank (1985) finds that, among other factors, sectoral choice is influenced by wage comparison. Heitmueller (2006) manages to quantify this effect and finds that an increase of 1 percent in the public sector's expected wage increases the probability employment in that sector by 1.3 percent for men and 2.9 percent for women.
The micro evidence supports the directed search assumption in the steady state. However, over the business cycle, as the public sector premium is different for subgroups based on characteristics that do not change over the cycle, small changes in private sector wages might not be sufficient to change aggregate search patterns. Note that the successful functioning of this mechanism does not require every unemployed to swing between sectors, as long as a small number at the margin are so able. Anecdotal evidence presented in the introduction already suggests that the same mechanism is also relevant over the business cycle.
The case with random search
Although directed search is an important part of the mechanism, the main results are also robust if we consider search as being random. Consider the following specification in which the unemployed do not have a choice where to search:
There is one matching function that has unemployment and the total number of vacancies as inputs. In this setting, public sector wages do not have any externality on the matching function, only public sector vacancies. However, public sector wages still affect the value of unemployment and, hence, the outside option of the worker when bargaining.
In this setting, optimality only requires optimal vacancies in both sectors. The government can set the optimal level of government vacancies directly, incorporating the resulting externality. As there is one less variable for efficiency, the government can now use public sector wages as an instrument to achieve the optimal level of private vacancies. This means that, for any bargaining power of the worker (even if the Hosios condition is not satisfied), only one public sector wage will achieve the optimal level of private sector vacancies. As with directed search, higher public sector wages imply both higher wages and lower vacancies in the private sector, and hence higher unemployment. This is also true over the business cycle. Unemployment volatility is higher if public wages are kept constant. In essence, directed search amplifies the costs of not following the optimal policy through the endogenous decision of where to search.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the links between public and the private sectors through the labour market. The main normative conclusion is that government wage policy plays a key role in attaining efficient allocation of jobs across sectors. In the steady state, the optimal public sector wage premium should reflect differences in labour market friction parameters. Although other reasons exist for governments to set wages, namely to induce effort or avoid corruption, they should weigh the cost of such an action in terms of labour market inefficiency, as higher wages relative to the private sector induce queues and higher equilibrium unemployment.
Over the business cycle, public sector wages should follow those in the private sector. Otherwise, in recessions, too many people queue for public sector jobs whilst in expansions, few people apply for them. Although I have abstracted from financing issues, a procyclical public sector wage has the advantage of requiring a lower tax burden in recessions. However, it also has drawbacks. First, lowering public sector wages in recessions might prove politically difficult to implement. Yet, to achieve efficiency in the labour market, the only relevant wages are those of new hires, which are potentially easier to reduce in recessions.
Second, it does not seem plausible that government can vary wage from quarter to quarter. However, indexing annual wage increases to the evolution of their private sector counterparts is possible. Finally, I have ignored the insurance role of the government. If agents are risk averse, they would prefer to have a constant income profile throughout the business cycle, which is an argument for acyclical wages. While this line of reasoning is valid, one has to realise that the intertemporal insurance is achieved at the cost of greater fluctuations in unemployment.
The results on optimal policy are relevant in two ways. First, studies of optimality in fiscal policy have primarily focused on the taxation side because on the spending side, it is harder to dissociate optimal policy from preferences. In the model, government policy on vacancies and employment faces the same problem, which is why I give it little relevance. On the other hand, the results of government wages essentially depend on the labour market, which allow us to develop a more robust theory of optimal spending, at least for one of its components.
The result is considered relevant because despite being simple and intuitive, optimal business cycle policy does not seem to be acknowledged by policy makers who view government wages as a stabilization tool. In a recent occasional paper from the European Central Bank (Holm-Hadulla, Kamath, Lamo, Pérez, and Schuknecht (2010) ), the authors argue that the government should avoid mild wage procyclicality, as increasing wages in expansions might boost aggregate demand and amplify the business cycle. As we have seen, this policy could heavily distort the labour market. To stabilise demand, the government can use either employment, purchases of intermediate goods, investment or transfers, but leave the wage to promote efficiency in the labour market.
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Figures A2-A6 show the optimal steady-state wages in both sectors, the optimal tightness, the optimal the share of unemployed searching in the public sector, the optimal public sector employment and the unemployment rate as a function of the labour market friction parameters in the public sector, as well as the technology and utility function parameters. Figure A7 shows how these variables change with public sector wages. Figure A10 shows the optimal public-private wage ratio in steady-state as a function of the bargaining power of workers, for three different calibrations. If the frictions are symmetric across the two sectors and the Hosios condition is satisfied the government has to set the same wage as in the private sector to guarantee an efficient level of private vacancies. If the bargaining power of workers is higher than the Hosios condition, the government has to set lower wages to reduce the value of unemployment enough to increase the surplus of the firms and bring their vacancies in line with optimality.
For the asymmetric calibrations in which the separation rate is lower in the public sector the optimal public sector wage should be lower than the public sector. Lower separation rate raises the value of unemployment and hence the threat point in the bargaining. As in directed search, the government should offer lower wages to compensate. Note: the thick dotted line is for a calibration with symmetric frictions (λ g = λ p = 0.0397 and ς g = ς p = 1.5); the solid line (λ g = 0.0139 and ς g = ς p = 1.5) and the dash line (λ g = 0.0139 and ς g = 0.8) Figure A11 shows the response to a technology shock when the government follows a procyclical and acyclical public sector wage policies. In both cases, the government maintains public employment constant. When the government keeps the wage constant, private sector vacancies do not fall by as much, leading to a larger fall in private vacancies and a stronger increase in unemployment. The response of unemployment is twice as strong. The response of the variables is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for unemployment rate which is in percentage points difference from steady-state.
